496 lines
16 KiB
Go
496 lines
16 KiB
Go
package openpgp
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import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/errors"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet"
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)
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func TestKeyExpiry(t *testing.T) {
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kring, err := ReadKeyRing(readerFromHex(expiringKeyHex))
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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entity := kring[0]
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const timeFormat = "2006-01-02"
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time1, _ := time.Parse(timeFormat, "2013-07-01")
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// The expiringKeyHex key is structured as:
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//
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// pub 1024R/5E237D8C created: 2013-07-01 expires: 2013-07-31 usage: SC
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// sub 1024R/1ABB25A0 created: 2013-07-01 23:11:07 +0200 CEST expires: 2013-07-08 usage: E
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// sub 1024R/96A672F5 created: 2013-07-01 23:11:23 +0200 CEST expires: 2013-07-31 usage: E
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//
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// So this should select the newest, non-expired encryption key.
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key, _ := entity.encryptionKey(time1)
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if id, expected := key.PublicKey.KeyIdShortString(), "96A672F5"; id != expected {
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t.Errorf("Expected key %s at time %s, but got key %s", expected, time1.Format(timeFormat), id)
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}
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// Once the first encryption subkey has expired, the second should be
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// selected.
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time2, _ := time.Parse(timeFormat, "2013-07-09")
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key, _ = entity.encryptionKey(time2)
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if id, expected := key.PublicKey.KeyIdShortString(), "96A672F5"; id != expected {
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t.Errorf("Expected key %s at time %s, but got key %s", expected, time2.Format(timeFormat), id)
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}
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// Once all the keys have expired, nothing should be returned.
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time3, _ := time.Parse(timeFormat, "2013-08-01")
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if key, ok := entity.encryptionKey(time3); ok {
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t.Errorf("Expected no key at time %s, but got key %s", time3.Format(timeFormat), key.PublicKey.KeyIdShortString())
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}
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}
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func TestMissingCrossSignature(t *testing.T) {
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// This public key has a signing subkey, but the subkey does not
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// contain a cross-signature.
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keys, err := ReadArmoredKeyRing(bytes.NewBufferString(missingCrossSignatureKey))
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if len(keys) != 0 {
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t.Errorf("Accepted key with missing cross signature")
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}
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("Failed to detect error in keyring with missing cross signature")
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}
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structural, ok := err.(errors.StructuralError)
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if !ok {
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t.Fatalf("Unexpected class of error: %T. Wanted StructuralError", err)
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}
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const expectedMsg = "signing subkey is missing cross-signature"
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if !strings.Contains(string(structural), expectedMsg) {
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t.Fatalf("Unexpected error: %q. Expected it to contain %q", err, expectedMsg)
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}
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}
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func TestInvalidCrossSignature(t *testing.T) {
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// This public key has a signing subkey, and the subkey has an
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// embedded cross-signature. However, the cross-signature does
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// not correctly validate over the primary and subkey.
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keys, err := ReadArmoredKeyRing(bytes.NewBufferString(invalidCrossSignatureKey))
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if len(keys) != 0 {
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t.Errorf("Accepted key with invalid cross signature")
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}
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("Failed to detect error in keyring with an invalid cross signature")
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}
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structural, ok := err.(errors.StructuralError)
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if !ok {
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t.Fatalf("Unexpected class of error: %T. Wanted StructuralError", err)
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}
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const expectedMsg = "subkey signature invalid"
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if !strings.Contains(string(structural), expectedMsg) {
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t.Fatalf("Unexpected error: %q. Expected it to contain %q", err, expectedMsg)
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}
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}
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func TestGoodCrossSignature(t *testing.T) {
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// This public key has a signing subkey, and the subkey has an
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// embedded cross-signature which correctly validates over the
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// primary and subkey.
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keys, err := ReadArmoredKeyRing(bytes.NewBufferString(goodCrossSignatureKey))
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if len(keys) != 1 {
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t.Errorf("Failed to accept key with good cross signature, %d", len(keys))
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}
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if len(keys[0].Subkeys) != 1 {
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t.Errorf("Failed to accept good subkey, %d", len(keys[0].Subkeys))
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}
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}
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func TestRevokedUserID(t *testing.T) {
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// This key contains 2 UIDs, one of which is revoked:
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// [ultimate] (1) Golang Gopher <no-reply@golang.com>
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// [ revoked] (2) Golang Gopher <revoked@golang.com>
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keys, err := ReadArmoredKeyRing(bytes.NewBufferString(revokedUserIDKey))
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if len(keys) != 1 {
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t.Fatal("Failed to read key with a revoked user id")
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}
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var identities []*Identity
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for _, identity := range keys[0].Identities {
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identities = append(identities, identity)
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}
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if numIdentities, numExpected := len(identities), 1; numIdentities != numExpected {
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t.Errorf("obtained %d identities, expected %d", numIdentities, numExpected)
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}
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if identityName, expectedName := identities[0].Name, "Golang Gopher <no-reply@golang.com>"; identityName != expectedName {
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t.Errorf("obtained identity %s expected %s", identityName, expectedName)
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}
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}
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// TestExternallyRevokableKey attempts to load and parse a key with a third party revocation permission.
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func TestExternallyRevocableKey(t *testing.T) {
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kring, err := ReadKeyRing(readerFromHex(subkeyUsageHex))
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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// The 0xA42704B92866382A key can be revoked by 0xBE3893CB843D0FE70C
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// according to this signature that appears within the key:
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// :signature packet: algo 1, keyid A42704B92866382A
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// version 4, created 1396409682, md5len 0, sigclass 0x1f
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// digest algo 2, begin of digest a9 84
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// hashed subpkt 2 len 4 (sig created 2014-04-02)
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// hashed subpkt 12 len 22 (revocation key: c=80 a=1 f=CE094AA433F7040BB2DDF0BE3893CB843D0FE70C)
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// hashed subpkt 7 len 1 (not revocable)
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// subpkt 16 len 8 (issuer key ID A42704B92866382A)
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// data: [1024 bits]
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id := uint64(0xA42704B92866382A)
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keys := kring.KeysById(id)
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if len(keys) != 1 {
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t.Errorf("Expected to find key id %X, but got %d matches", id, len(keys))
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}
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}
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func TestKeyRevocation(t *testing.T) {
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kring, err := ReadKeyRing(readerFromHex(revokedKeyHex))
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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// revokedKeyHex contains these keys:
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// pub 1024R/9A34F7C0 2014-03-25 [revoked: 2014-03-25]
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// sub 1024R/1BA3CD60 2014-03-25 [revoked: 2014-03-25]
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ids := []uint64{0xA401D9F09A34F7C0, 0x5CD3BE0A1BA3CD60}
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for _, id := range ids {
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keys := kring.KeysById(id)
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if len(keys) != 1 {
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t.Errorf("Expected KeysById to find revoked key %X, but got %d matches", id, len(keys))
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}
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keys = kring.KeysByIdUsage(id, 0)
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if len(keys) != 0 {
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t.Errorf("Expected KeysByIdUsage to filter out revoked key %X, but got %d matches", id, len(keys))
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}
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}
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}
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func TestKeyWithRevokedSubKey(t *testing.T) {
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// This key contains a revoked sub key:
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// pub rsa1024/0x4CBD826C39074E38 2018-06-14 [SC]
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// Key fingerprint = 3F95 169F 3FFA 7D3F 2B47 6F0C 4CBD 826C 3907 4E38
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// uid Golang Gopher <no-reply@golang.com>
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// sub rsa1024/0x945DB1AF61D85727 2018-06-14 [S] [revoked: 2018-06-14]
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keys, err := ReadArmoredKeyRing(bytes.NewBufferString(keyWithSubKey))
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if len(keys) != 1 {
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t.Fatal("Failed to read key with a sub key")
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}
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identity := keys[0].Identities["Golang Gopher <no-reply@golang.com>"]
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// Test for an issue where Subkey Binding Signatures (RFC 4880 5.2.1) were added to the identity
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// preceding the Subkey Packet if the Subkey Packet was followed by more than one signature.
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// For example, the current key has the following layout:
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// PUBKEY UID SELFSIG SUBKEY REV SELFSIG
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// The last SELFSIG would be added to the UID's signatures. This is wrong.
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if numIdentitySigs, numExpected := len(identity.Signatures), 0; numIdentitySigs != numExpected {
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t.Fatalf("got %d identity signatures, expected %d", numIdentitySigs, numExpected)
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}
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if numSubKeys, numExpected := len(keys[0].Subkeys), 1; numSubKeys != numExpected {
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t.Fatalf("got %d subkeys, expected %d", numSubKeys, numExpected)
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}
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subKey := keys[0].Subkeys[0]
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if subKey.Sig == nil {
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t.Fatalf("subkey signature is nil")
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}
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}
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func TestSubkeyRevocation(t *testing.T) {
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kring, err := ReadKeyRing(readerFromHex(revokedSubkeyHex))
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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// revokedSubkeyHex contains these keys:
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// pub 1024R/4EF7E4BECCDE97F0 2014-03-25
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// sub 1024R/D63636E2B96AE423 2014-03-25
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// sub 1024D/DBCE4EE19529437F 2014-03-25
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// sub 1024R/677815E371C2FD23 2014-03-25 [revoked: 2014-03-25]
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validKeys := []uint64{0x4EF7E4BECCDE97F0, 0xD63636E2B96AE423, 0xDBCE4EE19529437F}
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revokedKey := uint64(0x677815E371C2FD23)
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for _, id := range validKeys {
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keys := kring.KeysById(id)
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if len(keys) != 1 {
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t.Errorf("Expected KeysById to find key %X, but got %d matches", id, len(keys))
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}
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keys = kring.KeysByIdUsage(id, 0)
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if len(keys) != 1 {
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t.Errorf("Expected KeysByIdUsage to find key %X, but got %d matches", id, len(keys))
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}
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}
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keys := kring.KeysById(revokedKey)
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if len(keys) != 1 {
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t.Errorf("Expected KeysById to find key %X, but got %d matches", revokedKey, len(keys))
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}
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keys = kring.KeysByIdUsage(revokedKey, 0)
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if len(keys) != 0 {
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t.Errorf("Expected KeysByIdUsage to filter out revoked key %X, but got %d matches", revokedKey, len(keys))
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}
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}
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func TestKeyWithSubKeyAndBadSelfSigOrder(t *testing.T) {
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// This key was altered so that the self signatures following the
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// subkey are in a sub-optimal order.
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//
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// Note: Should someone have to create a similar key again, look into
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// gpgsplit, gpg --dearmor, and gpg --enarmor.
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//
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// The packet ordering is the following:
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// PUBKEY UID UIDSELFSIG SUBKEY SELFSIG1 SELFSIG2
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//
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// Where:
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// SELFSIG1 expires on 2018-06-14 and was created first
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// SELFSIG2 does not expire and was created after SELFSIG1
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//
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// Test for RFC 4880 5.2.3.3:
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// > An implementation that encounters multiple self-signatures on the
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// > same object may resolve the ambiguity in any way it sees fit, but it
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// > is RECOMMENDED that priority be given to the most recent self-
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// > signature.
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//
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// This means that we should keep SELFSIG2.
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keys, err := ReadArmoredKeyRing(bytes.NewBufferString(keyWithSubKeyAndBadSelfSigOrder))
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if len(keys) != 1 {
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t.Fatal("Failed to read key with a sub key and a bad selfsig packet order")
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}
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key := keys[0]
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if numKeys, expected := len(key.Subkeys), 1; numKeys != expected {
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t.Fatalf("Read %d subkeys, expected %d", numKeys, expected)
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}
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subKey := key.Subkeys[0]
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if lifetime := subKey.Sig.KeyLifetimeSecs; lifetime != nil {
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t.Errorf("The signature has a key lifetime (%d), but it should be nil", *lifetime)
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}
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}
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func TestKeyUsage(t *testing.T) {
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kring, err := ReadKeyRing(readerFromHex(subkeyUsageHex))
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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// subkeyUsageHex contains these keys:
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// pub 1024R/2866382A created: 2014-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
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// sub 1024R/936C9153 created: 2014-04-01 expires: never usage: E
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// sub 1024R/64D5F5BB created: 2014-04-02 expires: never usage: E
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// sub 1024D/BC0BA992 created: 2014-04-02 expires: never usage: S
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certifiers := []uint64{0xA42704B92866382A}
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signers := []uint64{0xA42704B92866382A, 0x42CE2C64BC0BA992}
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encrypters := []uint64{0x09C0C7D9936C9153, 0xC104E98664D5F5BB}
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for _, id := range certifiers {
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keys := kring.KeysByIdUsage(id, packet.KeyFlagCertify)
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if len(keys) == 1 {
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if keys[0].PublicKey.KeyId != id {
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t.Errorf("Expected to find certifier key id %X, but got %X", id, keys[0].PublicKey.KeyId)
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}
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} else {
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t.Errorf("Expected one match for certifier key id %X, but got %d matches", id, len(keys))
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}
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}
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for _, id := range signers {
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keys := kring.KeysByIdUsage(id, packet.KeyFlagSign)
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if len(keys) == 1 {
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if keys[0].PublicKey.KeyId != id {
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t.Errorf("Expected to find signing key id %X, but got %X", id, keys[0].PublicKey.KeyId)
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}
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} else {
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t.Errorf("Expected one match for signing key id %X, but got %d matches", id, len(keys))
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}
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// This keyring contains no encryption keys that are also good for signing.
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keys = kring.KeysByIdUsage(id, packet.KeyFlagEncryptStorage|packet.KeyFlagEncryptCommunications)
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if len(keys) != 0 {
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t.Errorf("Unexpected match for encryption key id %X", id)
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}
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}
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for _, id := range encrypters {
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keys := kring.KeysByIdUsage(id, packet.KeyFlagEncryptStorage|packet.KeyFlagEncryptCommunications)
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if len(keys) == 1 {
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if keys[0].PublicKey.KeyId != id {
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t.Errorf("Expected to find encryption key id %X, but got %X", id, keys[0].PublicKey.KeyId)
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}
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} else {
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t.Errorf("Expected one match for encryption key id %X, but got %d matches", id, len(keys))
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}
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// This keyring contains no encryption keys that are also good for signing.
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keys = kring.KeysByIdUsage(id, packet.KeyFlagSign)
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if len(keys) != 0 {
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t.Errorf("Unexpected match for signing key id %X", id)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestIdVerification(t *testing.T) {
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kring, err := ReadKeyRing(readerFromHex(testKeys1And2PrivateHex))
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if err := kring[1].PrivateKey.Decrypt([]byte("passphrase")); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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const identity = "Test Key 1 (RSA)"
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if err := kring[0].SignIdentity(identity, kring[1], nil); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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ident, ok := kring[0].Identities[identity]
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if !ok {
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t.Fatal("identity missing from key after signing")
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}
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checked := false
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for _, sig := range ident.Signatures {
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if sig.IssuerKeyId == nil || *sig.IssuerKeyId != kring[1].PrimaryKey.KeyId {
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continue
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}
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if err := kring[1].PrimaryKey.VerifyUserIdSignature(identity, kring[0].PrimaryKey, sig); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("error verifying new identity signature: %s", err)
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}
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checked = true
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break
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}
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if !checked {
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t.Fatal("didn't find identity signature in Entity")
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}
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}
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func TestNewEntityWithPreferredHash(t *testing.T) {
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c := &packet.Config{
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DefaultHash: crypto.SHA256,
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}
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entity, err := NewEntity("Golang Gopher", "Test Key", "no-reply@golang.com", c)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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for _, identity := range entity.Identities {
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if len(identity.SelfSignature.PreferredHash) == 0 {
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t.Fatal("didn't find a preferred hash in self signature")
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}
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ph := hashToHashId(c.DefaultHash)
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if identity.SelfSignature.PreferredHash[0] != ph {
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t.Fatalf("Expected preferred hash to be %d, got %d", ph, identity.SelfSignature.PreferredHash[0])
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}
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}
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}
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func TestNewEntityWithoutPreferredHash(t *testing.T) {
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entity, err := NewEntity("Golang Gopher", "Test Key", "no-reply@golang.com", nil)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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for _, identity := range entity.Identities {
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if len(identity.SelfSignature.PreferredHash) != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("Expected preferred hash to be empty but got length %d", len(identity.SelfSignature.PreferredHash))
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}
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}
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}
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func TestNewEntityCorrectName(t *testing.T) {
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entity, err := NewEntity("Golang Gopher", "Test Key", "no-reply@golang.com", nil)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if len(entity.Identities) != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("len(entity.Identities) = %d, want 1", len(entity.Identities))
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}
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var got string
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for _, i := range entity.Identities {
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got = i.Name
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}
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want := "Golang Gopher (Test Key) <no-reply@golang.com>"
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if got != want {
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t.Fatalf("Identity.Name = %q, want %q", got, want)
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}
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}
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func TestNewEntityWithPreferredSymmetric(t *testing.T) {
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c := &packet.Config{
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DefaultCipher: packet.CipherAES256,
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}
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entity, err := NewEntity("Golang Gopher", "Test Key", "no-reply@golang.com", c)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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for _, identity := range entity.Identities {
|
|
if len(identity.SelfSignature.PreferredSymmetric) == 0 {
|
|
t.Fatal("didn't find a preferred cipher in self signature")
|
|
}
|
|
if identity.SelfSignature.PreferredSymmetric[0] != uint8(c.DefaultCipher) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Expected preferred cipher to be %d, got %d", uint8(c.DefaultCipher), identity.SelfSignature.PreferredSymmetric[0])
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestNewEntityWithoutPreferredSymmetric(t *testing.T) {
|
|
entity, err := NewEntity("Golang Gopher", "Test Key", "no-reply@golang.com", nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatal(err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, identity := range entity.Identities {
|
|
if len(identity.SelfSignature.PreferredSymmetric) != 0 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Expected preferred cipher to be empty but got length %d", len(identity.SelfSignature.PreferredSymmetric))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestNewEntityPublicSerialization(t *testing.T) {
|
|
entity, err := NewEntity("Golang Gopher", "Test Key", "no-reply@golang.com", nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatal(err)
|
|
}
|
|
serializedEntity := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)
|
|
entity.Serialize(serializedEntity)
|
|
|
|
_, err = ReadEntity(packet.NewReader(bytes.NewBuffer(serializedEntity.Bytes())))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatal(err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|